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IMITATION MAY NOT ALWAYS
BE THE SINCEREST FORM OF
FLATTERY: WHY COLOR WARS
IN THE UNITED STATES AND
EUROPE MAY RESULT IN
BRAND DILUTION AND COLOR
DEPLETION
Taylor Piscionere*
I.

INTRODUCTION

“There is a difference between imitating a good man and
counterfeiting him.”1
The United States and the European Union have long recognized trademarks as an important component of intellectual
property law and commerce. The main purposes of trademark
law are to protect the public from confusion regarding the
sources of goods and services and to protect businesses from
the dilution of their brands through misrepresentation or misappropriation of one another.2
A trademark in the United States is understood as a distinctive mark, symbol, or emblem utilized by a manufacturer to
identify and distinguish his particular goods from those of others.3 The statutory definition of a “trademark” is found in the
*JD Pace University School of Law 2013, served as Editor-in-Chief of
Pace International Law Review. I owe special thanks to my parents, Jeryl
and Tony, my sister, Alex, and my boyfriend, Michael. Thank you for your
love and support throughout my law school journey. Thank you to the Pace
International Law Review Editorial Board, Senior Associates, and Junior Associates. Special thanks to Managing Editor Adam Kusovitsky, without
whom this publication would not have been possible.
1 Benjamin Franklin Quotes and Quotations, FAMOUS QUOTES &
AUTHORS, http://www.famousquotesandauthors.com/topics/imitation_quotes.
html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012).
2 Overview of Trademark Law, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y,
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited
Feb. 26, 2012).
3 Id.
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Lanham Act, a collection of federal statutes that govern United
States trademark law. According to 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127,
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2)
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and
applies to register on the principal register established by this
chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.4

Although the aforementioned statute seems to include a
broad range of goods and services, there are exceptions that are
not allotted trademark protection. One such exception is that
of a “functional design.” Functional designs can never acquire
trademark protection since the interest in avoiding confusion is
outweighed by unfair competition strategies.5 The Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition states, “A design is functional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of
alternative designs.”6 In other words, the mark cannot serve
any other significant function apart from distinguishing a
firm’s goods and identifying its source. 7
Articles four through five of the European Union’s Council
Regulation defines community trademarks (as they are termed
in the European Union) as:
Any signs capable of being represented graphically (particularly
words, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their
packaging) provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing
the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other undertakings.
The following natural or legal persons, including authorities established under public law, may be proprietors of Community
trade marks:
(a) nationals of the Member States; or
(b) nationals of other States which are parties to the Paris

4

Act).

15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2012) (defining terms used in the Lanham

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995).
Id.
7 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995).
5
6
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Convention8 for the protection of industrial property . . . ; or
(c) nationals of States which are not parties to the Paris Convention who are domiciled or have their seat . . . within the territory of the Community or of a State which is party to the Paris Convention;
(d) nationals . . . of any State which is not party to the Paris
Convention and which, according to published findings, accords
to nationals of all the Member States the same protection for
trade marks as it accords to its own nationals and, if nationals
of the Member States are required to prove registration in the
country of origin, recognizes the registration of Community
trade marks as such proof.9

Excluded from the Council’s regulations are signs that are
not suitable to serve as trademarks; trademarks which are devoid of any distinctive character; trademarks consisting of
signs or indications that have become customary in current
parlance or commercial practice; trademarks which are contrary to public policy or to accepted principles of morality; and
trademarks which are of such a nature as to deceive the public,
as to the nature, quality, or geographical origin of the goods or
service.10 The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market
(OHIM) regulates the trademarks that are registered in the
European Union under this statute and their legality is overseen by The Court of Justice of the European Union.11
Both the United States and the European Union have recently recognized nontraditional marks in keeping with modern
marketing and branding. Companies now employ branding
techniques that utilize nontraditional marks to distinguish
their products. 12 Among the most popular are color, sound, and

Union created to protect industrial property (including trademarks) of
members of the treaty. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
9 Council Regulation 40/94, arts. 4-5, 1993 O.J. (L 011) (EC) [hereinafter
Council Regulation 40/94].
10 Id.
11 See Manual of Trademark Practice, OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE
INTERNAL MARKET (Nov. 12, 2012), http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/CTM/
legalReferences/guidelines/OHIMManual.en.do.
12 Melissa E. Roth, Something Old, Something New, Something Borrowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark Registrations, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 458 (2005).
8
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even scent.13 The Lanham Act now includes provisions for protection of color trademarks, provided that color has acquired a
secondary meaning.14 The European Union, through case law
and recent treaties, has also recognized color as an integral
part of trademark law.15
This comment will focus on the way in which courts in the
United States and the European Union have navigated the
nontraditional waters of the relevant intellectual property
statutes through their statutory interpretations, knowledge of
common business administration, and their understanding of
commerce. More specifically, this comment will focus on color
trademarks, the threat of dilution, and how United States and
European Union laws on this topic interact.
II. TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER THE
LANHAM ACT
The Lanham Act codifies United States trademark law and
further imposes restrictions on the types of subject matter eligible for trademark registration and protection. The Act always requires that the mark be distinctive in order to be afforded such protections.16 This requirement may be satisfied
by showing that the mark is (1) inherently distinctive, or has
acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning and (2) is
not functional.17 Registering one’s trademark provides constructive notice and protects registrant’s interests by preventing misappropriation of the mark.18 However, misappropriation occurs often, and when faced with such situations, the
courts must decide if (1) the mark merits protection and (2) the
infringer’s use of the same or sufficiently similar mark is likely
See id. at 460.
15 U.S.C.A. § 1125.
15 See Council Regulation 40/94, supra note 9.
16 Diane E. Moir, Trademark Protection of Color Alone: How and When
Does a Color Develop Secondary Meaning and Why Color Marks Can Never
Be Inherently Distinctive, 27 TOURO L. REV. 407, 409 (2011).
17 See id.
18 In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, 183 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999)
(“Registration serves as constructive notice to the public of the registrant’s
ownership of the mark, see 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1946), and thus prevents another user of the mark from claiming innocent misappropriation as a trademark
infringement defense”) (citation omitted).
13
14

https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/2

4

PISCIONEREMCR (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

5/7/2013 5:33 PM

COLOR WARS

47

to cause consumer confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of
the infringer’s product.19 The first question directly deals with
the statutory definition of a trademark. 20 A court begins its
analysis with the statutory presumption that the trademark is
valid.21 That presumption of validity may be rebutted.22
Regarding color, the seminal trademark case in the United
States is Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.23 Before
the Court, the issue was whether the Lanham Act permitted
the registration of a specific shade of green as a trademark. 24
In Qualitex, the dry cleaning firm Qualitex registered the
green-gold color it used on its press pads as a trademark. 25 Jacobson Products, a Qualitex competitor and defendant in this
matter, began manufacturing and distributing an inferior quality press pad in a very similar green-gold color, albeit before
Qualitex registered its mark.26 In deciding whether or not
trademark law should extend to color alone, the court analyzed
the narrow issues of shade confusion and color depletion.27
Defendant Jacobson’s main argument was that if the law
permits a brand to trademark a color, it would produce irresolvable court disputes about which shade of color a competitor
may use.28 Since lighting affects perceptions of color, competitors and courts would suffer from “shade confusion” in their
analysis of whether the competitor color is too similar and
thereby confuses consumers.29 The Qualitex court opined that
courts have to make difficult determinations about sufficiently
similar words, phrases, and symbols, which is no different than

See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 114
(2d Cir. 2009); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a).
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127.
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital
Mgmt., Inc., 192 F. 3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999).
22 See Lane Capital Mgmt., 192 F.3d at 345.
23 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 159.
24 See id. at 161.
25 Jean Hayes Kearns, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.: Orange
You Sorry The Supreme Court Protected Color?, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 337,
338 (1996).
26 Id. at 159.
27 Id. at 167, 169.
28 Id. at 167.
29 Id.
19
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determining whether two colors are sufficiently similar. 30
“‘[S]trong’ marks, with greater secondary meaning, receive
broader protection than ‘weak’ marks.”31 The Court did not see
why it would not be able to replicate lighting conditions under
which a product is normally sold, if necessary, to aid in its determination.32
Jacobson’s second argument concerned color depletion,
claiming that color supply is limited and a competitor’s inability to find a suitable color would put that competitor at a significant disadvantage.33 The Qualitex court was not persuaded by
this argument, stating, “It relies on an occasional problem to
justify a blanket prohibition. When a color serves as a mark,
normally alternative colors will likely be available for similar
use by others.”34 This scarcity issue is defeated by the doctrine
of “functionality,” which prevents anti-competitive consequences that defendant’s argument posits, thereby minimizing the
argument’s practical force.35 The functionality doctrine forbids
a product’s feature from being trademarked where the feature
is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects its
cost or quality,” thereby putting the competitor at a disadvantage.36 The Qualitex court, therefore, concluded that the
functionality doctrine deters interference with current legitimate competition and potentially future competition.37
Jacobson further attempted to point to older cases in support of its position, which prohibited trademark protection for
color alone.38 Since these cases interpreted trademark law beId.
Id.
32 Id. at 168.
33 Id.
34 Id.
35 Id. at 169.
36 Id. at 165. If functional features could be trademarked, the company
holding the trademark could perpetually prevent competitors from using that
feature in their own products and effectively, free market competition would
thereby be hindered. See Kearns, supra note 25, at 338-39.
37 See Qualitex, 514 U.S at 169.
38 Coca–Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S. 143, 147 (1920); A.
Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171
(1906); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877); Life Savers Corp. v.
Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 8 (7th Cir. 1950) (holding that colors are not
protectable under trademark law).
30
31
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fore 1946, when Congress enacted the Lanham Act, Jacobson’s
argument held no merit in the modern courtroom.39 The Lanham Act extended protection to descriptive marks by making
clear that “nothing . . . shall prevent the registration of a mark
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the applicant’s goods in commerce.”40 The language in this statute allows ordinary words normally used for a non-trademark purpose to act as a trademark where it has garnered a secondary
meaning, so it would logically follow that the statute applies to
colors as well.41
Jacobson finally argued that color alone does not need
trademark protection because it is already protected as “trade
dress,” or use of a color as part of a trademark. 42 The Court rejected this argument finding, in many instances, a firm may
want to use a color, “pure and simple,” instead of color as part
of a design.43 In addition, the Court posited that trademark
law protects the holder of the mark in many ways that “trade
dress” protection cannot; thus, the law provides trade dress
protection in addition to trademark protection, not in lieu of
trademark protection.44
In summary, the Qualitex court held that “color alone, at
least sometimes, can meet the basic legal requirements for use
as a trademark. It can act as a symbol that distinguishes a
firm’s goods and identifies their source, without serving any
other significant function.” 45 When “color is not essential to a
product’s use or purpose and does not affect cost or quality . . .
the doctrine of ‘functionality’ does not create an absolute bar to
the use of color alone as a mark.”46 This decision was the first
of its kind to carve out an opening in the Lanham Act for color
trademarks and prompted other courts to consider other nontraditional marks such as sound47 and smell.48
See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171.
15 U.S.C. 1052(f) (West 2012).
41 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171-72.
42 Id. at 173.
43 Id. at 174.
44 See id. (addressing the ability to prevent importation of confusingly
similar goods).
45 Id. at 166.
46 Id. at 165.
47 Roth, supra note 12, at 457.
39
40
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Although Qualitex blazed the yellow brick road of color
trademark recognition, one modern case reminds us that the
Qualitex holding is not infallible.49 In the most recent color
trademark case decided by the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Laurent Christian, Louboutin sued Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) for
trademark infringement and unfair competition under the
Lanham Act.50 YSL asserted various counterclaims, seeking
cancellation of Louboutin’s trademark registration and damages.51 Louboutin cleverly colored the outsoles of his shoes a
glossy, vivid red, deviating from the industry custom to give his
line of shoes “energy.”52 He chose a shade of red because he regarded it as “engaging, flirtatious, memorable, and the color of
passion,” as well as “sexy.”53 The fashion industry responded to
his bold divergence from the market and Louboutin now commands up to $1,000 a pair.54 The United States Patent and
Trademark Office (PTO) approved registration of these red
soles (Red Sole Mark). 55
Louboutin claimed that YSL, a fashion house, infringed on
his trademark by using the same or a confusingly similar shade
of red protected by the Red Sole Mark in its 2011 collection. 56
“Each of the challenged models bears a bright red outsole as
part of a monochromatic design in which the shoe is entirely
red.”57 To succeed in its claims under the Lanham Act,
Louboutin had to demonstrate that (1) its Red Sole Mark merits protection; and (2) YSL’s use of the same or a sufficiently
similar mark is likely to cause consumer confusion as to the
origin or sponsorship of YSL’s shoes. 58
Id.
See generally Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am.
Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2012).
50 Id.
51 Id. at 214.
52 See id. at 211.
53 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp.
2d 445, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir.
2012).
54 Id. at 448.
55 Id.
56 Id. at 449.
57 Id.
58 Id. at 450 (citation omitted).
48
49
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Using the aforementioned definition of a trademark,59 the
Second Circuit had to decide the narrow issue of whether the
Lanham Act extends trademark protection to a single color
used as “an expressive and defining quality of an article of
wear produced in the fashion industry.”60 The district court’s
whimsical analysis recognized the art of fashion, aesthetics,
and creativity, and not just as products created to serve a
commercial purpose.61
Louboutin himself would probably feel his sense of honneur
wounded if he were considered merely a cobbler, rather than an
artiste . . . . Color constitutes a critical attribute of the goods each
form designs. [C]olor depicts elemental properties. As it projects
expression of the artist's mental world, it captures the mutability, the fancy, the moods of the visual world, in both spheres
working as a means to execute singular concepts born of imagination for which not just any other shade will do. Hence, color in
this context plays a unique role. It is a feature purposely given to
an article of art or design to depict the idea as the creator conceived it, and to evoke an effect intended. In ornamenting, it
draws attention to itself, and to the object for which its tone
forms a distinct expressive feature. From these perspectives, color in turn elementally performs a creative function; it aims to
please or be useful, not to identify and advertise a commercial
source.62

Color, according to the district court, is the most crucial
feature to fashion design, where every pigment of the spectrum
is freely available for the creator to apply.63 The contrary,
therefore, also applies. Allowing one artist to appropriate an
entire shade and thus inhibiting ambiguous shades that may
look like the appropriated shade “would unduly hinder not just
commerce and competition, but art as well.”64 The court felt
that the law should not condone such restraints that would in59 “Any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . [,]
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to
register . . . , to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . from those manufactured and sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.” Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1127).
60 Id. at 451.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 452-53
63 Id. at 453.
64 Id.

9
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terfere with creativity and stifle competition by granting a monopoly of color to one designer engaged in the same trade or
business.65
The next question of functionality is paramount to the discussion of whether a single color in the fashion industry can
constitute a valid mark.66 As outlined in Qualitex, the functionality doctrine determines whether or not a product’s feature may be trademarked.67 Use of a single color has been held
functional in prior cases and is therefore, not protectable under
the Lanham Act.68 The district court opined that even though
the outsole of a shoe is a pedestrian and functional aspect,
when coated in a bright and unexpected color in order to attract, stand out, or decorate, these attributes become nontrademark functions of color in fashion. 69
The color red and the lacquered red sole, two components
of the mark, are serious threats to legitimate competition in
the designer shoe market, according.70 Louboutin’s claim to
“the color red” is overly broad and inconsistent with the purpose and scheme of the Lanham Act’s trademark registration. 71
The southern district reasoned that granting a monopoly to one
participant in the shoe market would be damaging to other designers who wish to express their creative and artistic work. 72
If red were the primary color of the new season, Louboutin’s
Id.
Id.
67 Id. at 453 (citing Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169) (“The functionality doctrine…forbids the use of a product’s feature as a trademark where doing so
would put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is
‘essential to the use or purpose of the article’ or ‘affects [its] cost or quality.’”)
68 Id.; see, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527,
1533 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (black for marine outboard engines held functional because it is “compatib[le] with a wide variety of boat colors and [can] make objects appear smaller”); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc.,, 560 F. Supp. 85, 98
(S.D. Iowa 1982) (green for farm equipment held functional because farmers
“prefer to match their loaders to their tractor”), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir.
1983).
69 Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454.
70 See id. (describing whether or not “granting the trademark rights for
Louboutin’s brand would ‘significantly hinder competition,’ that is, ‘permit
one competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate (non-trademark related) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important
product ingredient’”).
71 See id.
72 Id.
65
66
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claim would cast a cloud over the entire industry, hindering
other designers while allowing Louboutin a full palate from
which to work.73 Competitors attempting to examine which
color is actually registered by Louboutin would, therefore, be
unable to precisely identify which shade is available for use or
one that is confusingly too close.74 This uncertainty may very
well breed a specter of fashion wars that courts will have to
referee and set a bright line rule that will continuously be
crossed and drawn again.75
Luckily, the Second Circuit cured the Southern District’s
incorrect decision, as it was in direct conflict with the Qualitex
decision, holding:
[T]he District Court's conclusion that a single color can never
serve as a trademark in the fashion industry was based on an incorrect understanding of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality
and was therefore error. We further hold that the District Court's
holding, that Louboutin's trademark has developed “secondary
meaning” in the public eye, was firmly rooted in the evidence of
record and was not clearly erroneous, and that the Red Sole
Mark is therefore a valid and enforceable trademark. We limit
the Red Sole Mark pursuant to Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C. § 1119, to a red lacquered outsole that contrasts with the
color of the adjoining “upper.”76

II. TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER EUROPEAN
LAW
Trademark laws in the European Union are relatively
young and therefore less centralized than those in the United
States. There are two initiatives that combine to form European Union Trademark Law: the First Council Directive (The
1998 Directive),77 which requires European Union Member
States78 to adapt or “harmonize” their trademark laws,79 and
Id.
Id.
75 Id. at 457.
76 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228.
77 Roth, supra note 12, at 465 (citing Luis-Alfonso Duran, The New European Trademark Law, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 489, 499 (1995)).
78 Twenty-seven member countries or states make up the European Union: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithua73
74
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the Community Trade Mark Regulation.80
To receive protection under the 1998 Directive, a design
must be new and have individual character.81 A design is considered new if “no identical design has been made available to
the public” prior to the application’s filing date and has individual character if the “overall impression” on the “informed
user” differs from any preexisting design.”82 The 1998 Directive “protects the design’s overall appearance as well as any
part arising from the ‘lines, contours, colours, shape, texture
and/or materials of the product itself and/or its ornamentation.’”83 If an article receives protection under this directive, it
is protected for up to twenty-five years from the filing date.84
The Community Trademark Regulation imposed a uniform
trademark system in which a single registration with the
Community Trade Mark85 grants exclusive protection and
rights to the trademark holder in all EU countries.86 In 2002, a
provision was enacted by the European Union Council that
provided additional rights for designs with the European Regulation on Community Designs (“2002 Regulation”). 87 The 2002
Regulation offers similar protections to those in the 1998 Dinia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia,
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.
See Countries,
EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited
Oct. 2012).
79 Roth, supra note 12, at 465 (discussing the purpose of the Directive to
synthesize the laws of Member States rather than create a uniform trademark system); see Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 040) 1 (EC)
[hereinafter Directive]. The Directive grants Member States authority to legislate on matters such as procedures concerning registration, revocation, invalidity, and priority.
80 Roth, supra note 12, at 464.
81 Sara R. Ellis, Copyrighting Couture: An Examination of Fashion Design Protection and Why the DPPA and the IDPPA Are a Step Towards the
Solution to Counterfeit Chic 78 TENN. L. REV. 163, 190 (2010) (citing Council
Directive 98/71, art. 1, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28, 30 (EC), available at
http://www.ipjur.com/data/981013DIR9871EC.pdf).
82 Council Directive 98/71, art. 4-5, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28, 30 (EC).
83 Id. art. 1.
84 Id. art. 10.
85 The term “Trade Mark” in the European Union is preferred, while the
term “trademark” is the standard in the United States.
86 See, e.g., Vincent O’Reilly, The Community Trademark System: A Brief
Introduction and Overview, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 93 (2004).
87 Ellis, supra note 82, at 193 (citations omitted).
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rective, except it extends protection to unregistered trademarks
as well as registered designs.88 The 2002 Regulation clarifies
that since its purpose is to prevent copying, its protections
would not prohibit works that were born of independent creation.89 Registered designs under the 2002 Regulation are also
protected for twenty-five years, but unregistered designs are
limited to a term of three years.90
Although “theoretically, in the European Union, any mark,
including sound, scent, or color mark, is registrable as long as
it is capable of graphic representation and distinguishes the
goods or services of one undertaking from the goods or services
of another,”91 the European Union has just recently recognized
nontraditional trademarks and still treads cautiously about
what nontraditional trademarks are registrable. 92 Graphic
representation is not simply a technical requirement for European Union registration, it exemplifies the “principle of precision.”93 Graphic representation, a vital part of nontraditional
trademark registration, ensures that the scope and nature of
the mark are clearly defined and comprehensible so that those
checking the registry can determine what has already been registered.94
The European Court of Justice (ECJ),95 the highest court in
the European Union, requires that graphic representation
See Council Directive 98/71, art. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28, 30 (EC).
Ellis, supra note 82, at 192 (citations omitted).
90 Id.
91 Roth, supra note 12, at 466 (citing Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v.
Joost Kist H.O.D.N., 2004 E.T.M.R. 33, ¶¶ 34-41).
92 The Truth About Trade Marks, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., May 2004, at
32. Nearly eighty percent of in-house counsel surveyed stated that legal certainty was a very important aspect of the registration process.
93 Roth, supra note 12, at 466 (citing Case C-49/02, Heidelberger
Bauchemie GmbH, 2004 E.T.M.R. 99, ¶ 13).
94 Id. (citing Sieko Hidaka et al., A Sign of the Times? A Review of Key
Trade Mark Decisions of the European Court of Justice and Their Impact Upon National Trade Mark Jurisprudence in the EU, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1105,
1124 (2004); see also Abida Chaudri, Graphically Speaking: Registering
Smell, Colour and Sound Marks in the UK and Europe, 157 TRADEMARK
WORLD 26 (May 2003)).
95 It interprets EU law to ensure that the law is applied uniformly in all
EU countries. The E.C.J. is made up of twenty-seven judges, one judge per
EU country. See Presentation, CVRIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_
7024/ (last visited Oct. 2012).
88
89
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must be “clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelligible, durable and objective.”96 The rationale of the ECJ is to
enable precise definition of the mark so that the trademark
holder, consumers, and competitors can ascertain the scope of
the trademark protection.97 The graphic representation must
be durable so that the mark is uniform and systematic, which
will guarantee that the mark is an invariable indication of the
source.98 Finally, the ECJ requires that the representation be
unambiguous and objective, ensuring that registration, protection, and enforcement of the trademark is consistent.99
The ECJ first addressed the issue of color marks in the
European Union in Libertel Groep BV v. BeneluxMerkenbureau.100 In Libertel, the ECJ had to consider a number of questions relating to the registrability of single color
marks.101 Libertal was referred to the ECJ by a Dutch court in
relation to a trademark application for the color orange by
Libertel.102 The ECJ began its analysis with the legal background of trademark law in the European Union, citing the
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris
Convention”) and the aforementioned Directive.103 According to
the court, trademark law is governed at the international level
by the Paris Convention, signed in Paris on March 20, 1883. 104
It was last revised in Stockholm on July 14, 1967.105 All member states are signatories to the Convention.106 According to
the court, Article 6(B)(2) provides that “trademarks may be deRoth, supra note 12, at 467.
See id. at 466. See generally Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches
Patent-und Markenan 2002 E.C.R. I-11737.
98 Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent-und Markenan 2002
E.C.R. I-11737, ¶ 53.
99 Id. ¶ 54.
100 Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux- Merkenbureau, 2003
E.C.R. I-03793.
101 See id.
102 Id. ¶¶ 1-2.
103 See id. ¶ 3.
104 Id.
105 Id.
106 Id. There are 174 contracting parties to the Paris Convention. Treaties
and Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG., http://www.wipo.int
/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=ANY&end_year=A
NY&search_what=C&treaty_all=ALL (last visited Dec. 1, 2012).
96
97
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nied registration or invalidated when they are devoid of any
distinctive character.”107 Moreover, Article 6(C)(1) outlines the
standard for determining if a mark is protectable: “In determining whether a mark is eligible for protection, all the factual
circumstances must be taken into consideration, particularly
the length of time the mark has been in use.”108
Although the ECJ outlined the Paris Convention as the
governing international law, it primarily used Article 2 and Article 6 of the Directive in determining its holding.109 A graphic
representation within the meaning of Article 2 of the 1988 Directive must enable the sign to be represented visually, particularly by means of visual images, lines, or characters in order
to be precisely identified.110 Article 6 of the 1988 Directive concerns the limits on the effects of a trademark once it has been
registered; even though registration would result in color depletion for competitors, the court believes that the importance
of trademarks outweighs this issue.111
107 Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux- Merkenbureau, 2003
E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 4
108 Id. ¶ 5.
109 Id. Article 2 of the Directive, entitled “Signs of which a trade mark
may consist,” provides as follows; “A trade mark may consist of any sign capable of being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal
names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging,
provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of
one undertaking from those of other undertakings.”
110 See id. ¶ 28.
111 Id. ¶ 58. Article 6 of the Directive, entitled “Limitations of the effects
if a trade mark,” provides as follows:
1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third
party from using, in the course of trade,
(a) his own name or address;
(b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of
rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or
services;
(c) the trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended
purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare
parts; provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in
industrial or commercial matters.
2. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third
party from using, in the course of trade, an earlier right which only
applies in a particular locality if that right is recognized by the laws of
the Member State in question and within the limits of the territory in
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The court held that “to graphically represent a color mark,
an applicant must submit a sample or swatch of the color and
designate the color using an internationally recognized identification code.”112 The ECJ deemed the use of an internationally
recognized color code an acceptable graphic representation,
since it is precise, uniform, and stable.113 A color sample alone
would be insufficient and a verbal description of the color failed
to satisfy the requirements of clarity, precision, selfcontainment, easy accessibility, intelligibility, and objectivity,
even though it would technically be a form of graphic representation.114
A more recent application of European trademark law can
be found in Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH.115 In that case,
the applicant of the color trademark, a company involved in the
building trade, sought to register the color combination of blue
and yellow “in every conceivable form.”116 The representation
of the claimed mark consisted of a rectangle with the top half
blue and the bottom half yellow and the applicant provided the
appropriate color codes.117 The ECJ held that the graphic representation of color combinations could not be registered unless
it portrayed the colors in a “systematic arrangement associating the colours concerned in a predetermined and uniform
way.”118 This way, it would be easier to determine the source of
the trademark and the scope of the trademark holder’s
rights.119
Such representations would allow numerous different combinations, which would not permit the consumer to perceive and recall a particular combination, thereby enabling him to repeat
which it is recognized
112 Roth, supra note 12, at 477 (citing Id. ¶ 68). An applicant seeking to
register the color orange, for example, must submit a swatch of the particular
shade of orange it claims as a trademark and the corresponding color code
from an internationally recognized color chart, such as a Pantone® Color
Code, RGB Color Code or RAL Color Code.
113 See id.
114 See id.
115 See Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I06129.
116 Id. ¶ 8.
117 Id.
118 Roth, supra note 12, at 477 (citing Id. ¶ 35).
119 Id.
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with certainty the experience of a purchase, any more than they
would allow the competent authorities and economic operators to
know the scope of the protection afforded to the proprietor of the
trade mark.120

Under the Directive, this decision implies that a nonsystematic arrangement of a combination of colors cannot constitute a “sign.”121 The court was also concerned with color depletion, finding there is a public interest in not unduly restricting the availability of colors for other traders of goods or
services of the same type.122 Therefore, the graphic representation must be so clear and precise that it would always be perceived unambiguously and uniformly.123 “Without this, the
traders could not confidently identify the extent of third-party
rights.”124
Had the Louboutin case been decided in the European Union, the result would most likely mirror the Southern District’s
decision in Louboutin. Since a color sample alone would be insufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Libertel court,
Louboutin’s trademark would still be considered void.
IV. HOW LAWS MAY BE ALTERED TO BETTER ACCOMMODATE
COMMERCE
It would be wise for the United States to adopt and require
the European Union’s model of an internationally recognized
color code in the process of trademark registration, rather than
simply permitting the use of the color code. 125 That way, uniformity may exist across the United States as well as the
world. Globalization is a reality that courts must recognize,
since commerce and commercialization now live in a broader
realm than simply the United States. In an attempt to accomplish this goal, the United States entered into treaties with
Heidelberger, ¶ 8.
Roth, supra note 12, at 477
122 Heidelberger, ¶ 41.
123 Id.; see Make Your Mark: European Perspectives, JENKINS, http://
www.jenkins.eu/mym-autumn-2004/the-ecjs-recent-judgment.asp (last visited
Jan. 4, 2012).
124
Make Your Mark: European Perspectives, JENKINS, http://
www.jenkins.eu/mym-autumn-2004/the-ecjs-recent-judgment.asp (last visited
Jan. 4, 2012).
125 Either Pantone® Color Code, RGB Color Code, or RAL Color Code.
120
121
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other countries, namely, the Madrid Protocol.126 The Madrid
Protocol promotes efficiency and uniformity by ensuring
trademark holders protection of their marks in multiple countries through the filing of one application with a single office, in
one language, with one set of fees, in one currency.127
While an International Registration may be issued, it remains
the right of each country or contracting party designated for protection to determine whether or not protection for a mark may be
granted. Once the trademark office in a designated country
grants protection, the mark is protected in that country just as if
that office had registered it. The Madrid Protocol also simplifies
the subsequent management of the mark, since a simple, single
procedural step serves to record subsequent changes in ownership or in the name or address of the holder with World Intellectual Property Organization's International Bureau. The International Bureau administers the Madrid System and coordinates
the transmittal of requests for protection, renewals and other
relevant documentation to all members.128

Another international agreement entered into by the United States is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellectual Property, one of the first intellectual property treaties.129
It established a union for the protection of industrial property
and attempted to harmonize trademark law and registration. 130
The initial objective of the convention was "the creation of a union which, without encroaching on the municipal law of the
contracting countries, would lay down a number of general
principles securing the interests of industrial property in the
interior of a country as well as abroad."131
126 See Madrid Protocol, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.
uspto.gov/trademarks/law/madrid/index.jsp (last modified Sept. 19, 2012).
127 Id.
128 Id.
129 See Treaties and Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year
=ANY&end_year=ANY&search_what=C&treaty_all=ALL (last visited Dec. 1,
2012). The convention has 174 contracting parties, making it one of the most
widely adopted treaties in the world. The Paris Convention is administered
by the World Intellectual Property Association (WIPO).
130 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20,
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305.
131 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS:
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 63 (1975).
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The primary issue with the aforementioned treaties is even
though they attempt to promote uniformity of registration, they
do not achieve uniformity in the outcome of the law. The International Trademark Association (INTA), a not-for-profit
membership organization, has sought to do just that.132 INTA
was founded in 1878 by 17 merchants and manufacturers who
saw a need for an organization “to protect and promote the
rights of trademark owners, to secure useful legislation and to
give aid and encouragement to all efforts for the advancement
and observance of trademark rights.”133 Today, 5,900 trademark owners, professionals, and academics from over 190 countries comprise INTA’s powerful network.134 Headquartered in
New York City, INTA has offices all over the world. 135
In 2005, INTA released the Model Free Trade Agreement
(MFTA), which provides parties of Free Trade Agreements
(FTA) with a set of baseline proposals to consider when negotiating trademark-related provisions, which has been revised in
2011 (2011 MFTA).136 The document attempts to “provide governments and their trade negotiators with guidance for incorporating desirable trademark provisions into FTAs.”137 As the
trend for international trade negotiations continues, the
“INTA, through its 2011 MFTA seeks to contribute to the harmonization of national laws with international treaties.”138 The
provisions of the 2011 MFTA attempt to create “greater legal
certainty as the level of protection of trademarks owners’ rights
is raised.”139 As well, “trading partners will benefit equally as
the new rights protection and enforcement mechanisms help
create a more attractive investment climate for business,
whether it is between two countries or within a regional mar-

132 See Overview, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, http://www.inta.org/About/
Pages/Overview.aspx, (last visited Feb. 20, 2012).
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, INTA MODEL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 4
(2011), available at http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTAModel
FreeTradeAgreement.pdf.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
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ket taking part in an FTA.”140 The 2011 MFTA seeks to unify
member countries’ laws on the scope of trademark protection,
registration procedures, notice of registration procedures, comparative advertising, licensing and assignment, automation of
Trademark Office’s practice and procedures, term of trademark
protection, Internet domain names, enforcement of trademark
rights, administrative procedures and remedies, trademark
owners’ right to access information, measures to cease transit
of counterfeit goods, improvements in the international legal
framework for criminal sanctions, and border measures taken.141
Currently, there exist countless treaties that do not begin
to cover the breadth of information and legal guidance that the
2011 MFTA seeks to include. Furthermore, nontraditional
marks, such as color, constantly evolve with technological advances and the laws must keep up with the market. The 2011
MFTA addresses these issues. What the agreement does not
address are the ways in which each member country would
deal with these procedures. Even though a trademark is registrable according to the 2011 MFTA, that does not mean that
each country will recognize the mark in the same way, or at all.
For instance, would the European Union treat a color trademark case involving fashion differently than one involving a
construction business? If Louboutin were decided in the European Union, would the result be the same? Perhaps, but perhaps not. This is the central issue regarding trademark law
and the broader category of intellectual property law. Universal registration does not indicate or ensure uniform results,
even though the treaties currently in place seek to create this
consistency.
Trademark law is complicated. It forces courts to become
arbiters of commercial industries in which, perhaps, they have
no experience.142 In Louboutin, the Southern District of New
York recognized that courts are routinely called upon to decide
difficult questions in trademark disputes.143 Those questions
may involve shades of differences in words, phrases, symbols,
Id.
See id.
142 See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. at 456.
143 Id.
140
141
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or colors. With colors, distinctions in designs and ideas conveyed by single colors “represent not just matters of degree but
much finer qualitative and aesthetic calls.”144 This logic not only applies to nontraditional marks, but to all trademarks for
which knowledge of a particular market or industry is imperative to making a proper determination.
V.

CONCLUSION

Intellectual property law has become a specialized and
globalized area of law that requires substantive and procedural
specialty.145 Additionally, emerging technological issues and
the development of e-commerce may redefine the role of the
judge in a wide range of intellectual property cases. 146 Intellectual property is arguably one of the most rapidly evolving areas
of law, and therefore, the need for a specialized system becomes
increasingly urgent.147 Since focused courts will give judges the
chance to deal mainly or exclusively with intellectual property
disputes, they will create the opportunity to strengthen expert
knowledge on the matter and, consequently, will shorten the
length of the court’s procedure. 148
Perhaps it would be wise to introduce specialized courts to
deal with intellectual property issues. Judges could receive
training in intellectual property issues or consult with experts
who understand the intricacies associated with these matters.
Another way to address this issue on a global level is to
regulate intellectual property laws internationally. Although
this proposal would probably take years to implement, this industry is rapidly globalizing and registration treaties are the
first step in the process of international regulation. If a shoe
designer cannot trademark his signature outsoles in the United
States, he should not be allowed to trademark them in the European Union, a market where the product is also sold.
Id.
See International Survey of Specialised Intellectual Property Courts
and Tribunals, INT’L BAR ASS’N, http://www.ibanet.org/Search/Default.
aspx?q=International Survey of Specialized Intellectual Property Courts and
Tribunals, (last modified Oct. 20, 2011).
146 Id.
147 Id.
148 Id.
144
145
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Brands live internationally and, therefore, the courts must find
a way to streamline commerce so businesses can accurately
predict if their trademark registrations will be upheld in various countries.
Yet another way to encourage uniformity of intellectual
property laws is to resolve these disputes through Alternative
Dispute Resolution (ADR). An international tribunal could be
in charge of intellectual property disputes at the location where
the mark or copyright holder has registered through an international treaty.
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